

Eugenio Sinanyuca

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Militant, Nonrevolutionary Kuraka,
 and Community Defender

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The Bourbon monarchy's efforts to reform trade, mining policies, military organization, and patterns of colonial administration as well as to heighten fiscal pressures exacerbated existing political and social tensions in many Andean regions. In 1772, for example, the crown increased the sales tax (alcabala) from 2 percent to 4 percent on both colonial and European goods and only four years later raised the rate once again to 6 percent. The viceregal government also established customs houses in key cities and placed suboffices along major trade routes to collect sales taxes more effectively. Moreover, the crown disturbed regional trade patterns by removing Upper Peru (now Bolivia) from the Viceroyalty of Peru in 1776, placing it instead under the control of the newly created Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, with its capital in Buenos Aires. During this same period colonial officials made more accurate censuses of the indigenous population to ensure that tribute and other levies were collected efficiently. The net result was a dramatic upsurge in tax revenues, often accompanied by regional economic downturns that heightened local discontent. Such regional unrest among a wide array of social groups prompted a series of revolts between 1777 and 1780, but the most serious threats to Spanish authority came from the oppressed indigenous communities of Peru and Upper Peru between 1780 and 1783.

One of the most bloody revolts broke out southeast of Cuzco in Tinta (also called Canas y Canchis) and threatened to expel Spanish authorities from the old Inca heartland. The leader of the uprising was José Gabriel Condorcanqui, who took the name Túpac Amaru II after the Inca ruler who was executed by the Spanish in 1572. The Bourbon reforms had provoked considerable economic hardship in Tinta, worsening ethnic tensions among Andean communities and also conflicts over leadership positions. The corregidor, Antonio de Arriaga, exacerbated these problems by his heavy-handed administration of tribute and the reparto, the forced distribution and sale of goods by the corregidor to indigenous peoples and sometimes even to local Spaniards and mestizos. His policies led to

particularly bitter conflicts with Condorcanqui, who served as *kuraka* in Tinta. Túpac Amaru began his revolt by capturing Arriaga, stripping him of his position as *corregidor* (ostensibly on the authority of King Charles III), and executing him publicly on November 10, 1780, in Tungasuca, Tinta's capital. Within a few weeks a massive uprising had begun that spread from Tinta to Lake Titicaca and beyond.

Túpac Amaru used a diverse set of Andean and Christian symbols to develop an ideology capable of attracting a broad-based coalition, which included some Creoles and mestizos and a large following of Andeans. He took the title of *Sapa Inca* and dressed in royal tunics decorated with a figure of the sun, linking him to the Inca sun god, *Inti*. He also invoked the image of the king of Spain, a powerful symbol of unity in the Andes, by using the rallying cry of "Long Live the King, Down with Bad Government." Apart from such symbolic efforts to recruit allies, he also relied on kin, personal, and business connections (as a prominent local merchant) to raise a rebel army that reached nearly 100,000. This massive force controlled much of the region from Tinta to Puno (near Lake Titicaca), but his failure to capture the city of Cuzco in January 1781 led his military fortunes to decline rapidly. By February, Túpac Amaru had retreated to his command center in Tinta, where he was defeated, later captured, and then brutally executed in the Cuzco's main square.

Many local *kurakas* joined the rebellion led by Túpac Amaru, but some, such as Eugenio Sinanyuca, the ethnic leader of Coporaque, did not. Despite the close personal relationship between Túpac Amaru and Sinanyuca, both men took very different political stances in a series of local disputes between clerical authorities and government officials. Bad blood between the bishop of Cuzco, Juan Manuel Moscoso y Peralta, and *Corregidor* Arriaga intensified a clash over clerical fees and Church property in Yauri, a community in Canas y Canchis. When Bishop Moscoso sent his representative, Vicente de la Puente, to resolve the problem, the local indigenous population threatened to oppose him by force, and Arriaga supported them. De la Puente was also the parish priest of Coporaque, and his relations with Sinanyuca were strained, so the *kuraka* and the *corregidor* found themselves in an uneasy alliance against the bishop and those Churchmen supporting him. Túpac Amaru, however, was a friend and supporter of Moscoso and a sworn enemy of Arriaga. When the bishop excommunicated Arriaga, Sinanyuca, and the entire community of Coporaque over the escalating disputes, the political lines hardened. The importance of such disputes and personal relationships often proved as important as larger structural socioeconomic forces or political principles in determining the allegiances of key historical actors, such as Eugenio Sinanyuca, during the rebellions of the 1780s.

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In November 1780, Túpac Amaru, a *kuraka* (ethnic communal leader, or *cacique*) from the Cuzco province of Canas y Canchis, who also saw himself as the "Inca," rose in rebellion against the colonial state. He and his followers threatened Spanish control of the Andes in ways that it had not been challenged since the Conquest era. Spreading out from the rural Cuzco provinces of Quispicanchis and Canas y Canchis, the rebellion resonated with many indigenous peoples as well as with some mestizos and criollos and quickly gained followers throughout much of the Andes. Not all *kurakas* or ordinary indigenous people, however, supported the rebellion. Some, such as the *kuraka* Mateo Pumacahua, also from the Cuzco region but from a different *partido* or province, even fought for the Spaniards. From the community of Chinchero, Pumacahua led his people into battle against Túpac Amaru's army and was instrumental in the royalist defense of the city of Cuzco. The depth of the differences between the two *kurakas* was symbolized in a painting that Pumacahua commissioned after Túpac Amaru's capture. The painting "depicted a puma (Pumacahua) defeating a snake (*amaru*) beneath the benevolent gaze of the Virgin of Monserrat, Chinchero's patron saint. In the background stood Pumacahua and his wife, both dressed in Spanish garb, affirming their territorial sovereignty. Beneath the painting was inscribed Caesar's dictum: *Veni, Vidi, Vici* (I came, I saw, I conquered), commemorating the defeat of this rival faction."¹

There were other indigenous people, like Pumacahua and his followers, who took actions that caused them to be considered Spanish loyalists. Others, however, who were at best (or at worst) neutral in the struggle have often been lumped together under the label of "loyalists" when, in reality, their allegiances and motivations were more difficult to discern. The closer historians get to life "on the ground," the more complex the indigenous world appears. And so it was with Eugenio Sinanyuca, *kuraka* of Coporaque, one of the largest communities in the province of Canas y Canchis. As a result, he was well known to both the future rebel leader, Túpac Amaru, who sometimes referred to him as "cousin" in messages, and to Spanish officials. While Sinanyuca and many of the

people of Coporaque did not rise up with Túpac Amaru, it would be an oversimplification to characterize this kuraka and those who followed him as loyalists. In reality, they remained largely outside the scope of combatants for most of the rebellion, although some did link up with rebel forces when they appeared in Coporaque intent on recruiting followers. The distance that Sinanyuca and many Coporaque villagers felt between themselves and their rebellious neighbors had much to do with their face-to-face, day-to-day experiences with colonial officials and other Andean people. While villagers in rural Cuzco and much of the Andes, for that matter, shared the tensions and uncertainty wrought by the changes that disturbed this world in the mideighteenth century, in other respects their particular experience created political allegiances that divided them despite their geographical proximity.

First, the similarities: both Sinanyuca and Túpac Amaru faced difficulties in being installed as kurakas. For reasons that remain unclear, colonial authorities were reluctant to give Túpac Amaru power over the communities of Tungasuca, Surimana, and Pampamarca despite the fact that his father and older brother had held the position. Moreover, Túpac Amaru had attended the prestigious Jesuit school for the children of kurakas in Cuzco. Not surprisingly, the opposition of local corregidores to his aspirations to ethnic leadership made a potential enemy of the future rebel leader. Finally, in 1766, Túpac Amaru was made kuraka; because of a political dispute he was removed from power but then later reinstalled.² His path to power had not been smooth, and the corregidores of Canas y Canchis were responsible.

Eugenio Sinanyuca likewise had a difficult time assuming the post of kuraka in his home community of Coporaque. When the corregidor decided to replace the former cacique, Cristóbal Sinanyuca, with Eugenio, members of the Collana *ayllu* (one of eight such Andean kinship groups that composed the community of Coporaque) opposed his elevation to leadership. Shouting and using their slings, these people disrupted the ceremony and attacked those who were preparing to offer Mass as part of Eugenio's installation. Those who participated in these actions had been drinking *chicha* (corn beer) and *aguardiente* (cane alcohol) and chewing coca at Cristóbal's house at least three days prior to the violence. The former cacique even provided his ayllu members with most of what they drank and chewed, and he incited the violent opposition to Sinanyuca's formal assumption of power as kuraka. Influenced by alcohol and coca, which often promoted group solidarity in Andean communities, and encouraged by Cristóbal, himself notorious for his "public and continual drunkenness," these ayllu members used violence to block the leadership change.

Cristóbal had previously abandoned the community and only returned a few days before Eugenio was to take office. It was because of Cristóbal's absence, his frequent inebriation, and his neglect of duty that he had been removed from his post. While the vast majority of Coporaque did not take part in the action, there were rumors that Eugenio, who was described by a member of another ayllu as having a character admirable in its "formality, honor, and good judgement," who was known never to get drunk, and who got along well with Spaniards, would try to collect the back tribute owed by the Coporaque ayllu. The commotion quickly subsided, and Eugenio was installed. Once in office, he became an effective and respected leader.³ He not only staunchly defended community interests, working the legal system to the benefit of villagers whenever possible, but he also did not hesitate to break with the law and tradition to aid the people of Coporaque.

Both Eugenio Sinanyuca and Túpac Amaru became known for their opposition to abuses of the dreaded *mita* (forced labor) at the Potosí silver mines. Túpac Amaru had a special dislike of the *mita* that stemmed not only from what it did to the communities he governed but also from the harm that it had done to family members and might do to him as kuraka. His uncle, the kuraka Marcos Túpac Amaru, "was bankrupted by the seizure of a train of mules and 100 pesos' worth of goods because his *mita* quota was one man short."⁴ The lesson was not lost on the nephew of this unfortunate man. Túpac Amaru even traveled to Lima seeking not only recognition as "Inca" but exemption from the *mita* for his people and for other Canas y Canchis communities. Despite the failure of his mission, villagers in his province began to view Túpac Amaru as a special leader for his efforts. A priest from Canas y Canchis later observed that "when Túpac Amaru came back from this capital [that is, Lima] to his ancient home. . . . I noted the Indians looked at him with veneration, and not only in this village but even outside the province of Tinta (Canas y Canchis); the province, proud with his protection, imagined itself free from the *mita* obligation."⁵ Nonetheless, he saw that his *mita* contingents were delivered as required by colonial authorities.

Sinanyuca also disliked the *mita* but, like Túpac Amaru, he understood the necessity of complying with the service, both to protect himself and the community. At the same time, both kurakas protested its abuses and tried to end the system of forced labor. Thus, he too turned to the state to seek relief for his people. In 1775 some members of Coporaque's *mita* contingent abandoned Potosí before their term of service had ended and returned illegally to their community. Nevertheless, these were respected men with good reputations and therefore, even though detained by Sinanyuca, were treated well by the kuraka and other

leaders. This lenient response had its risks, however, since fleeing from mita service was not merely resistance to the state. Rather, it put the entire community at risk because the law held both the ayllu and the kurakas responsible for such actions.

Two days before Christmas, Sinanyuca and another local kuraka wrote to the corregidor that Bartolomé García, who had been in charge of the *mitayos* (a person serving in the mita), and Gregorio Choquecota, a mita worker, had returned from Potosí illegally, without fulfilling their obligations. Although he was being held by the community, the kurakas noted that the mitayos:

had experienced very bad whippings and affronts on the part of the head carpenter and other administrators of the refinery of don Bernardo Zenda and that it not being possible for them to endure such inhumane treatment they returned, obliged by the conservation of their lives to seek refuge, abandoning their pack llamas, their sleeping gear, and their prebend of food; that a few days earlier for the same reason two other *cédulas* [another term for mitayos] of the said mita did the same abandoning their wives and children: that when the women with their weeping [asked] said administrators not to mistreat thusly their husbands, they also mistreated them with blows, afterward locking them in a chapel, and that lately the cruelty of said administrators is so great that . . . they have forced the wives of these Indians to work in place of their husbands. The two aforementioned Indians, especially the *enterador* [person from the community responsible for overseeing mitayos] are known in these ayllus for being of very good repute, for which reason we cannot presume that they have come back fleeing, but obliged by serious motives. . . . We assure Your Majesty that we received continual complaints . . . for some years from the captain enteradores and *cédulas* who return from said mita, [and] they do not pay travel compensation nor justly [pay] daily wages, and that they oblige them to work more than physically possible and as a result many Indians return with chest injuries and they die here as asthmatics, for this reason everyone has the greatest horror of said mita. Although we have tried to persuade the two Indians to return to complete their mita time they absolutely resist and we do not have [the means] to send them by force a distance of more than two hundred leagues. . . . Captains have also complained on other occasions of violence. . . . We implore Your Majesty . . . for a remedy of the referred excesses that we bear and for which we ask justice.⁶

Sinanyuca placed his trust in his own "face-to-face" knowledge and experiences. Under these circumstances the kuraka and his entire community supported the assertions of their neighbors, who were citizens of good reputation. Besides, everyone knew of the abusive treatment meted out by these particular Spaniards who supervised the mitayos. Corregidor Juan Antonio Reparaz, one of the few officials in Canas y Canchis known for his fairness among the *naturales* (the colonial term for indigenous person), asked officials in Potosí to end abuses suffered by the mitayos in the refinery and ordered Bartolomé García and Gregorio Choquecota

freed on bail.⁷ Reparaz trusted the word of Sinanyuca, just as Sinanyuca trusted the word of people he knew to be honorable. Because their face-to-face dealings created trust, the corregidor, kurakas, and community members were able to work together to ameliorate a tense, difficult situation.

Apart from these problems regarding the mita, as kurakas in charge of their communities, Sinanyuca and Túpac Amaru shared a wide array of other concerns. In Canas y Canchis and Quispicanchis the population remained overwhelmingly indigenous throughout the colonial period; relatively few Spaniards settled in the provinces except in some rich agricultural areas or near the city of Cuzco. Although significantly altered over the course of more than two centuries of colonial rule, indigenous villages still maintained a strong set of common values over time. In the eighteenth century, however, lifeways began to change as indigenous peoples confronted increasingly difficult challenges. From the midseventeenth century the Andean population had begun to recover from the epidemic diseases introduced by the European invaders, producing acute shortages of land at a time when state demands for labor and taxes increased. Land was basic to economic and cultural survival for the indigenous peoples.

Over the course of the eighteenth century Spanish monarchs, like other rulers, gradually sought to exert greater control over their colonies. For some two centuries indigenous peoples had been subject to heavy tribute and forced labor levies, but from the mideighteenth century onward, the crown increased these responsibilities as population pressures and land scarcity made such burdens difficult to bear. Furthermore, individual colonial authorities (and even some kurakas) sought to increase their personal wealth by abusing their authority, adding their own demands to those of the state. As a result, many indigenous people increasingly questioned the legitimacy of their rulers, fearing that they could no longer maintain traditional ways of life. For many people in the southern Andes, these problems had become so severe that when confronted with a movement led by Túpac Amaru in 1780 that challenged colonial rule, they joined the rebel cause.

One of the most frequent complaints was against the *reparto*. In the 1750s the *reparto*, which had been functioning informally, was fully legalized. Instead of improving their situation, legalization made life for many in the indigenous communities more difficult. In Canas y Canchis, for example, the corregidor, Antonio de Arriaga, provoked tensions in the years just prior to the rebellion by distributing goods far in excess of the established quotas.⁸ *Reparto* rates per individual for Quispicanchis and Canas y Canchis were among some of the lowest in the Andes, but the prices assessed were still often double or triple the market price for

these goods. Mules were a major reparto item, and the villagers of Canas y Canchis and Quispicanchis were forced to receive 2,000 and 2,500 mules, respectively, in every reparto.⁹ This trade was especially important to Coporaque because the mules brought up from northern Argentina (Río de la Plata) were grazed on their pastures, and it was here that a great fair was held. The other large regional mule fair took place in Tungasuca, a community governed by Túpac Amaru. Thus, the communities ruled by both Sinanyuca and the future rebel leader were affected in complex ways both by economic changes and by heavy reparto quotas.

With their way of life threatened, the difficulties faced by Andean villagers worsened. For the reparto, each corregidor was supposed to make only one distribution of goods with a total fixed value during his five-year term of office, but many conducted multiple repartos at values far in excess of the established schedule. A Quispicanchis priest gave this account of the reparto in his community:

Right after the corregidores arrive in any town of their province, they send their servants to the *alcaldes* and *alguaciles* so that they will, from house to house and hacienda to hacienda, notify Spaniards and Indians (of whom they have a list) to come and present themselves in front of them to get the *repartimiento*; and their cashiers distribute to them not the items that they have asked for but whatever they want to give them, [and,] without even telling them nor negotiating the prices with them, they give them the bundles and write down the amounts owed. They [corregidores] break the tariffs set by law . . . and . . . this could not have been possible without excessively charging provincial Indians and Spaniards.¹⁰

In 1766, however, the priest of San Andrés de Checa also had argued that the corregidor had distributed some 300,000 pesos worth of goods even though he was legally allowed only 112,500 pesos.¹¹ Thus, Arriaga, accused years later by Túpac Amaru of making three repartos instead of the one permitted and of collecting a total of some 300,000 pesos instead of the assigned quota, certainly was not the first corregidor of Canas y Canchis to distribute goods far in excess of the legal limit.¹² Arriaga's repartos, however, came at a time of economic distress in the region, which probably sealed his fate once Túpac Amaru decided to rebel.

Local economic problems worsened when the crown divided the Viceroyalty of Peru in 1776, placing Upper Peru (now Bolivia) under the jurisdiction of the newly created Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, with its capital in Buenos Aires. This administrative change disrupted trade patterns and economic life throughout much of the southern Andes. Tensions increased further when colonial authorities in Lima increased the *alcabala* (sales tax), subjecting a number of items produced by naturales to the tax, which had previously been exempt. At the same time, customs houses were established to collect taxes with an unprecedented

level of efficiency. These changes added to the burdens on indigenous communities, particularly on kurakas involved in trade, and weakened the ties binding Andean villagers to the larger colonial society. Alone, none of these factors was significant enough to incite rebellion, but taken together, they exacerbated a growing economic crisis that contributed, in turn, to an even broader crisis within Andean communities. They were "the feather that broke the camel's back."¹³

Over time, worsening economic conditions lay behind a number of violent confrontations and incidents between colonial officials and Andean communities from the mideighteenth century, reaching a crescendo in the decade before Corregidor Arriaga was hanged to initiate Túpac Amaru's rebellion. Most of these were relatively minor incidents that tended to be local in character, spontaneous, and of short duration; they were directed against individuals and sought to maintain or restore an existing order or end abusive treatment.¹⁴ Nevertheless, these violent protests should have alerted colonial officials of the need to control abuses and rule with moderation, but this was not the case.

Perhaps colonial officials ignored the escalating levels of violence because, in reality, these incidents remained remote from the centers of regional power and were still fairly uncommon.¹⁵ There were a total of twenty-one parishes and annexed communities in the provinces of Quispicanchis and Canas y Canchis. Most parishes, in turn, had several ayllus from which tribute or reparto payments were collected. Tribute was collected twice per year, and then added to these figures were other demands for labor and personal service together with the chance for unpleasant encounters or even confrontations that could increase local tensions. From this perspective, given the potential for unrest, violence may have increased in the 1770s, but it still remained an infrequent occurrence.

When violence broke out in Quispicanchis or Canas y Canchis, the state usually tried to contain the problem so that it would not become more dangerous. To preserve crown authority, colonial administrators did not typically inflict harsh punishments for killing or attacking officials, especially when their abusive or excessive behavior threatened the existing order and undermined the protective justice and the legitimacy of the crown. The relatively light punishment often meted out in such instances was one way that viceregal authorities tried to preserve the colonial order and, perhaps, warn lower officials indirectly to curb their excesses. Harsher conditions, however, led Andeans to perceive what had been tolerable but oppressive (and sometimes illegal) demands over time as excessive and intolerable. As changing circumstances made it more difficult for naturales to meet exactions, state officials who enforced the demands were increasingly viewed as abusive tyrants. Under these

circumstances, certain abusive officials attracted attacks on their person, while other crown servants who enforced similar demands were not assaulted or otherwise harmed.

A tax collector (*cobrador*) in Cusipata (Quispicanchis), who was killed after trying to exact tribute, exemplifies these revolts. At first glance this incident appears to be a simple protest against tribute abuses, but upon closer examination it seems less a protest against colonial demands than a lashing out against a particularly hated and abusive official. In 1774, don Carlos Ochoa, a mestizo *cobrador*, went to collect the tribute owed by Lucas Poma Inga, the cacique of Cusipata. Ochoa, along with his brother and several associates, arrived at the house of Poma Inga and confronted him. Poma Inga could only pay 60 pesos of the tribute owed and offered the *cobrador* a promissory note for the remainder. Although Poma Inga was known for being reliable in meeting his obligations, this was not good enough for Ochoa, a man with a well-deserved reputation for sadistic cruelty. The *cobrador* and his friends hauled Poma Inga from his home, tied him up, beat him with a whip, and then took him to Ochoa's home where the cacique was again beaten and then locked in a storage room. Those who saw the cacique said that he had been severely abused, and a Spanish doctor and a scribe later testified that he was "very badly beaten over all of his body, the head, and stomach by fists, clubs, and kicks with spurs." Caciques from nearby Quiquijana also confirmed Poma's condition.

In desperation, Poma Inga's wife, whom the *cobrador* had also assaulted, asked the priest to intervene on her husband's behalf. The priest told her that Ochoa was "a very fearsome man and that he was not able to intervene," but after a second request from the desperate woman, the priest wrote a note to Ochoa. The *cobrador* not only ignored the message but verbally abused the person who delivered it. Seeing that their cacique was in bad shape and fearing for his life, the people of Poma Inga's ayllu decided to rescue him because of "the great love [they had] for their cacique." At night they broke into Ochoa's house, removed Poma Inga, and killed Ochoa for having treated their cacique badly and with "ignominy." Antonio Acuña, a tributary who served the priest, stated that at about eight in the evening there had been a great disturbance in the street and the priest had ordered the door of the church to be closed and barred. He and the priest passed a restless night in the church, and in the morning they opened a window and heard the news that Ochoa had been killed. Acuña and the priest went to the *cobrador*'s house and found his body on the floor "amid many stones."

After the incident the priest cared for Poma Inga, who was "almost without movement," in the church and later testified both to his good character and to the cruelty of the *cobrador*. Other people of European

descent also supported the actions of the community. Pascual Antonio de Loayza, a muleteer returning from the Coporaque livestock auction, stated that he knew Poma Inga well, considered him a friend, and knew that he was well respected by his ayllu. He had seen the kuraka being beaten and had observed his condition while locked up. Andres de Acosta, another Spanish muleteer, offered similar testimony. It was also reported that Poma Inga, even after being beaten, told his people "not to riot and to try to calm themselves."

While it is true that Ochoa was a *cobrador*, the people of Poma Inga's ayllu killed him not because of his post but because of his many abuses of power, which delegitimized his authority. They went beyond the bounds that governed Indian-Spanish relations in the colonial world. Neither the naturales nor the Europeans saw the killing as a challenge to colonial authority as a system. Violence was not directed at other representatives of the state nor at Europeans in general, and it did not go beyond the borders of the community. After the incident, Cusipata settled into its former routine, with normality restored for the time being.¹⁶

As the case of Ochoa indicates, face-to-face relations were important in determining the course of events. For instance, Juan Antonio Reparaz, a *corregidor* of Canas y Canchis, dealt fairly with the naturales whom he governed. He even donated 13,000 pesos of his own funds to build bridges for certain communities, including Tinta, the provincial capital of Canas y Canchis where Arriaga was later executed.¹⁷ It does not necessarily follow that the system Reparaz was enforcing was just. Indeed, his contribution toward the bridge most likely came from illicit profits from the reparto. Nevertheless, his treatment of the people of Canas y Canchis was perceived by them as fair within the context of an increasingly exploitative system.¹⁸ Thus, the colonial norms of behavior and understanding were maintained, making violent confrontation between naturales and Reparaz unlikely.

The majority of *corregidores* in Quispicanchis and Canas y Canchis were not as considerate as Reparaz. Excessive or new demands, violations of traditional arrangements, or abusive treatment strained or ruptured Indian-*corregidor* relations. In 1767, for example, *Corregidor* Pedro Muñoz de Arjona forced villagers in Pichigua and Yauri to transport dried llama dung to the silver mines of Condoroma, making it more difficult for these people to meet other state exactions. It should come as no surprise that Muñoz de Arjona had business dealings with Condoroma miners (although so did Túpac Amaru), and it was in his own interest to assure the supply of llama dung used in the refining process.¹⁹

Differences between colonial officials, the ways they were perceived, and the responses they evoked were apparent in the attitude of Túpac Amaru toward the last four *corregidores* who governed Canas y Canchis

prior to his rebellion. While he grew increasingly impatient with the system that the corregidores enforced, he clearly recognized differences between individuals. Of these four men, Túpac Amaru disliked two, had mixed feelings about one, and "got along well" with the other. Corregidor Gregorio de Viana "harassed him greatly with the *repartimiento*" and treated him badly in business dealings. The next corregidor, Muñoz de Arjona, confirmed him as kuraka of Pampamarca, Surimana, and Tungasuca, something that Viana had not done. Muñoz de Arjona and the future rebel coexisted in harmony for a while, but when the corregidor jailed the kuraka over a dispute with a tax collector, the relationship soured. Túpac Amaru "got along well" with the next corregidor, Reparaz. In commenting on how the actions of Reparaz influenced him, the rebel leader informed captors that "the rebellion had been thought of for many years, but he had not determined to rebel because Corregidor Reparaz, Arriaga's predecessor, had treated him very well and looked on the Indians with compassion."²⁰ Túpac Amaru had been swayed by the actions of an individual corregidor to set aside the idea of rebellion against the colonial state. Personal relations and behavior had made a difference. Túpac Amaru, however, did not hold a similar opinion of the next corregidor, Antonio de Arriaga, whom he hanged to begin the rebellion of 1780.

The differences between Sinanyuca and Túpac Amaru that led them down divergent paths, despite their considerable shared realities, stemmed more from the ways they related to Church-state conflicts than from the political and economic issues that are commonly seen as central to the rebellions of the early 1780s. These struggles between the Church and state drew in the peoples of Coporaque as well as those under Túpac Amaru's control and added complexity to indigenous-Spanish relations in Coporaque and much of the rest of Canas y Canchis in the years just prior to the great rebellion. The bishop of Cuzco, Juan Manuel Moscoso y Peralta, was friendly with Túpac Amaru. Bad blood existed between the bishop and Corregidor Arriaga, however, just as it did between Arriaga and Túpac Amaru. On the other hand, Sinanyuca got along reasonably well with Corregidor Arriaga, but he and the people of Coporaque were increasingly at odds with their priest and, because of this, with the bishop.

Eventually the bishop went so far as to excommunicate Sinanyuca and the villagers of Coporaque over these differences. The bishop and corregidor had first clashed while both were serving in the distant province of Tucumán (Río de la Plata), but when they were transferred to Cuzco, their dispute became public and reached crisis proportions. Priests and civil officials as well as Sinanyuca and Túpac Amaru took one side or the other in the dispute. In this situation what should have been personal problems came to have larger meaning because of the tensions that they

fostered between Church and state. These tensions, in turn, contributed significantly to local divisions such as those in the Canas y Canchis community of San Pablo de Cacha.²¹

As Epiphany approached in January 1780, the villagers of San Pablo de Cacha wanted to bring their Nativity scene from its chapel to the church to be blessed. However, they had not provided the expected "gift" for the local priests, so their request was denied. With their hopes for a religious festival dashed, the community raised not one, but two tumults against the priest. It was in this climate of acrimony that Francisco, the priest's slave, struck fear into the hearts of the villagers by fabricating a story that the corregidor was plotting to kill them in retaliation for their commotions against the priest. According to Francisco, Arriaga was sending 400 soldiers "to put them to the knife." Panic stricken, people fled to the surrounding countryside. In the flight one person fell from a bridge and was drowned. Arriaga, learning of the incident, had Francisco detained and then expelled him from the province stating that the law "prohibits that seditious and prejudicial blacks live among the naturales of these kingdoms." The rumor created an irrational fear of Arriaga, through no fault of his own, which further damaged his reputation. Writing to the priest, Arriaga, concerned about the impact of the incident, declared: "When fires are not promptly extinguished, their flames usually consume the most distant." These were especially prophetic words because only nine months later, Arriaga would become the kindling in the flames of the Túpac Amaru rebellion.²²

The personal authority of the corregidor of Canas y Canchis eroded further when Arriaga became involved in a jurisdictional fight between parish priests and Bishop Moscoso over control of Church property. Two Yauri kurakas, Diego José de Meza and Francisco Guambo Tapa, had rented Church lands from the priest, Justo Martínez. The bishop insisted that the Yauri priest comply with his orders giving him say over the property, but neither the kurakas nor the priest wanted the bishop interfering in their affairs. Arriaga sided with Joseph and Justo Martínez, the priests of Pichigua and Yauri, respectively. Despite this opposition the bishop sent the mulatto priest of Coporaque, Vicente de la Puente, to Yauri to enforce his wishes. De la Puente, already at odds with the people of Coporaque, did not improve his reputation in Yauri. First, he embargoed the priest's goods, but then he went too far when he had an aide break down the door to Justo Martínez's house. The kuraka and community members forcibly drove the aide out of the village.

Upon receiving this news, the bishop ordered de la Puente to return to Yauri to arrest the dissenting priest, but de la Puente's arrival was preceded by rumors including, once again, one that warned that naturales would be put to the knife. Unlike the people of San Pablo de Cacha,

the Yauri villagers did not flee. De la Puente arrived with armed support, but the community was prepared and a fight ensued in which several people were injured. Among those charged with responsibility for the tumult was Eugenio Sinanyuca. When representatives of the bishop injured an indigenous parishioner, Arriaga intervened in the case at the community's request and, most likely, because he was a friend of Justo Martínez. Bishop Moscoso excommunicated Arriaga "for protecting sacrilegious natives," but his bitter relationship with the prelate probably lay behind the act.²³ It was the bishop's representative, not the corregidor, who had abused the priest and people of Yauri. It was Arriaga, however, who publicly fell afoul of the Church, having sought to protect a natural and a priest from abusive Church officials.

As a result, while Arriaga is often portrayed as being alienated from the Church, he was really at odds with Bishop Moscoso and those priests who supported their superior. The corregidor was not alienated from all local priests. Those in Pichigua, Yauri, and Sicuani were his friends, and they were also generally on good terms with local parishioners. Because of personal conflicts, however, Moscoso undermined the power of these priests, which further eroded Arriaga's support in the religious circles of Canas y Canchis.

Excommunicated and portrayed as the planner of a massacre, Arriaga found that his authority was eroded by opposition from the bishop and his priestly supporters, who removed religious personnel friendly to Arriaga from their parishes. Made a scapegoat by Bishop Moscoso for abuses that in actuality rested more directly on the shoulders of the prelate, Arriaga's own well-known financial malfeasance made him increasingly vulnerable. Sinanyuca and the naturales of Coporaque, however, were increasingly at loggerheads with their parish priest, Vicente de la Puente, a close ally of the bishop. When the Coporaque priest carried out the bishop's orders in Yauri, Sinanyuca defied him. Tensions were such that the kuraka refused, during Mass, to supply a worker for the Church as tradition demanded. Sinanyuca did this on Corpus Christi of 1780, "repeating the preponderance of ritual in the most important social actions of these [Canas] communities."²⁴

Although de la Puente initiated legal action against Sinanyuca, with only minor exceptions, the naturales of Coporaque allied themselves with their kuraka. Sinanyuca also served as Arriaga's tribute collector and was on good terms with the ill-fated corregidor. De la Puente, backed by Bishop Moscoso, brought ecclesiastical charges against Sinanyuca, thus avoiding the civil authority of Sinanyuca's supporter, Arriaga, while enhancing the influence of his supporter and the corregidor's enemy, Bishop Moscoso. The kuraka, on the other hand, turned to Arriaga for help.

Troubles between the priest and the community obviously had been brewing for some time. In May 1780, de la Puente filed complaints against Sinanyuca for events that had happened over a year earlier. The priest stated that after Mass at the beginning of Mardi Gras of the previous year the people of Coporaque conducted their own "pagan" rituals, including offerings to the Earth of the hearts of sacrificed animals and the smearing of corral fences with a mixture of blood and colored dirt. The Coporaque priest claimed that acts were committed against his person and the "sacred order." In the ensuing year, Coporaque, under the guidance of Sinanyuca, denied the priest traditional "gifts" and did not fill voluntary, but expected, labor services.

The charges against Sinanyuca, instead of having a "chilling effect," spread tensions to the surrounding region. When the bishop ordered de la Puente and other clerics to enforce orders against Sinanyuca, they were threatened. The priest claimed that the community was "entirely stirred up" by Sinanyuca and Arriaga's aide, Francisco Cisneros. Observing piles of rocks in the plaza that had been placed there for use in a confrontation, the religious forces retired from Coporaque. When yet another Moscoso representative sought to remove Sinanyuca from office, the kuraka appeared before the residence of the priest in the company of some 500 villagers and in a loud voice informed the official that he would not leave. Later the naturales destroyed a church jail and rooms in the priest's house, while accusing de la Puente of having stolen money from the church and *cofradía* (religious sodality or brotherhood).²⁵

De la Puente, backed by armed guards, once again tried to reestablish authority in the community. Counting on the element of surprise by arriving early in the morning, he still underestimated his foe. Sinanyuca and the villagers were waiting for him. Using the church bells, Sinanyuca had summoned a thousand naturales who threatened the priest and his forces. The women were especially hostile. In the confrontation two of the priest's aides were stoned and one was "dragged from the patio of the [priest's] house to the jail, with such horrible blows that they left him for dead bathed in blood and the face like a swollen monster."²⁶ The tumult lasted over four hours, with community members parading in front of the priest's house carrying a coffin and singing an Inca war song: "We will drink from the skull of the traitor, we will use his teeth as a necklace, from his bones we will make flutes, from his skin a drum, afterwards we will dance."²⁷

The priest, and what remained of his guard and staff, fled while the people continued to dance and sing. After this incident the entire community of Coporaque, not just Sinanyuca, was excommunicated. Corregidor Arriaga, whose excommunication had been lifted, came to

the defense of Sinanyuca and Coporaque and began legal proceedings against local priests. He had promised to send their complaints to the viceroy or other high officials, but his own execution at the outset of the Túpac Amaru revolt kept him from complying.

The entire zone—Pichigua, Yauri, and Coporaque—had been upset by these conflicts between Bishop Moscoso, Corregidor Arriaga, and the priests and kurakas of these communities. In light of this struggle with the priest and bishop, it is hardly surprising that Sinanyuca and a great many of his people, who had been supported by Arriaga and excommunicated by the Church, remained aloof from Túpac Amaru, who was a friend of the bishop and who had executed the corregidor while priests friendly to the bishop watched. It was in this context that Sinanyuca made the decision not to join with Túpac Amaru when the rebellion broke out.

Sinanyuca and the people of Coporaque, and others like them, were not behaving in a manner contradictory to their interests. They made decisions based on local circumstances, their own experiences, and self-interest. They were not a generic Indian mass. They were not united with other communities or regions just because they were of the same race. They were the people of the ayllu of Coporaque and their leader was Eugenio Sinanyuca. In these personal matters they did not share Túpac Amaru's experiences or interests. Thus, out of reasons grounded in their own personal experience—their history—most people in Coporaque distanced themselves from the rebellion.

NOTES

1. Leon Campbell, "Ideology and Factionalism during the Great Rebellion, 1780–82," in *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries*, Steve Stern, ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 123–24.
2. Charles Walker, *Smoldering Ashes: Cuzco and the Creation of Republican Peru, 1780–1840* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 27; John Rowe, "Genealogía y rebelión en el siglo XVIII," *Histórica* 6:1 (1982): 74–76.
3. Archivo Departamental de Cusco (ADC). Corrg. Prov. Crim. Leg. 79, 1745–73. 1768. Don Cristóbal Sinanyuca cacique de Collana de Coporaque . . . se ha ausentado.
4. John Rowe, "The Inca under Spanish Colonial Institutions," *HAHR* 37 (1957): 176.
5. Jan Szeminski, "Why Kill the Spaniard?" in *Resistance, Rebellion*, 173.
6. ADC. Corrg. Prov. Crim. Leg. 80, 1773–75. 1775. Coporaque. Quejas de los caciques de Coporaque por el mal tratamiento que sus indios reciben en la mita de Potosí.

7. Ibid.
8. Jurgen Golte, *Repartos y Rebeliones* (Lima, 1980), 95; Lillian Estelle Fisher, *The Last Inca Revolt, 1780–1783* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966), 39; Ward Stavig, "Ethnic Conflict, Moral Economy, and Population in Rural Cuzco on the Eve of the Thupa Amaro II Rebellion," *HAHR* 68:4 (1988): 744.
9. Scarlett O'Phelan Godoy, *Rebellions and Revolts in Eighteenth-Century Peru and Upper Peru* (Cologne: Bohlau Verlag, 1978), 108.
10. Biblioteca Nacional del Perú. 1766. C3969. Informes de los curas de Oropesa, San Andrés de Checa y Tinta, acerca de la consulta formulada por el cabildo del Cuzco respecto a los repartimientos hechos por los corregidores.
11. Ibid. Also see Golte, *Repartos y Rebeliones*, 114–18; Fisher, *The Last Inca Revolt*, 13.
12. Golte, *Repartos y Rebeliones*, 95; Fisher, *The Last Inca Revolt*, 39; Stavig, "Ethnic Conflict," 744.
13. Scarlett O'Phelan Godoy, "Las reformas fiscales Borbónicas y su impacto en la sociedad colonial del Bajo y Alto Perú," in *The Economies of Mexico and Peru during the Late Colonial Period, 1760–1810*, Nils Jacobsen and Hans-Jurgen Puhle, eds. (Berlin, 1986), 342, 353.
14. William Taylor, *Drinking, Homicide, and Rebellion in Colonial Mexican Villages* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979).
15. Golte, *Repartos y Rebeliones*, 140 (Cuadro 33).
16. ADC. Corrg. Prov. Crim. Leg. 80, 1773–75. 1774. Don Lucas Poma Inga, cacique . . . de Cusipata de Quiquijana contra don Carlos Ochoa.
17. ADC. Intend. Prov. 1786. Expediente relativo a que se verifique la fabrica de puentes en Tinta poniendo una cantidad de pesos que dejo . . . el corregidor Reparaz (a 1785 case with 1786 materials).
18. Rowe, "Genealogía y rebelión," 74–76.
19. ADC. Corrg. Prov. Leg. 67, 1766–69. [H]ucha a minas de Condorama, 1767.
20. Rowe, "Genealogía y rebelión," 74–76; *Descargos del Obispo del Cuzco Juan Manuel Moscoso y Peralta*, vol. II of *Colección documental del bicentenario de la Revolución Emancipadora de Túpac Amaru* (Lima, 1980), 224.
21. Fisher, *The Last Inca Revolt*, 40.
22. ADC. Corrg. Prov. Leg. 81, 1776–84. 1780. Criminal contra Francisco negro libertino doméstico del cura.
23. Fisher, *The Last Inca Revolt*, 41; Luis Miguel Glave, *Vida símbolos y batallas. Creación y recreación de la comunidad indígena. Cusco, siglos XVI–XX* (Lima: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1992), 61–63.
24. Glave, *Vida símbolos y batallas*, 137. The information on Sinanyuca comes from Glave's account and *Túpac Amaru y la Iglesia. Antología* (Lima, 1983), 165–201.
25. Ibid., 141–46.
26. Ibid., 147–48.
27. Ibid., 148. "Beberemos en el cráneo del traidor, usaremos sus dientes como un collar, de sus huesos haremos flautas, de su piel haremos un tambor, después bailaremos."

SUGGESTED READINGS

For background material on rural Cuzco and the events leading to the Túpac Amaru rebellion, there are several works in English including Ward Stavig's *The World of Túpac Amaru: Conflict, Community, and Identity in Colonial Peru* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999); and idem, "Ethnic Conflict, Moral Economy, and Population in Rural Cuzco on the Eve of the Thupa Amaro II Rebellion," *HAHR* 68:4 (1988). For a broader sweep one might also look at Scarlett O'Phelan-Godoy, *Rebellions and Revolts in Eighteenth-Century Peru and Upper Peru* (Cologne: Bohlau Verlag, 1985), and Steve Stern, ed., *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987). Stern's work contains an interesting introduction and several articles, including Jan Szeminski's "Why Kill the Spaniard? New Perspectives on Andean Insurrectionary Ideology in the Eighteenth Century" and Leon Campbell's "Ideology and Factionalism during the Great Rebellion, 1780–82." The first chapters of Charles Walker's *Smoldering Ashes: Cuzco and the Creation of Republican Peru, 1780–1840* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999) contain work on Cuzco and the rebellion and are especially good from a local political perspective. For kurakas one might begin with Karen Spalding, "Social Climbers: Changing Patterns of Mobility among the Indians of Colonial Peru," *HAHR* 50:4 (1970). On the Church and state, David Cahill's "Curas and Social Conflict in the Doctrinas of Cuzco, 1780–1814," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 16:2 (1984) sheds light on trends that were developing even before the rebellion of 1780.