THE TRAGEDY OF SUCCESS

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Colonial rule meant impoverishment and death for millions of indigenous Peruvians. The conquest's trauma fueled the Taki Onqoy (literally, "dancing sickness") movement of the 1560s, where Indians possessed by Andean deities prophesied the expulsion of the Spaniards and their Christian God. Yet as historian Steve J. Stern underscores in this excerpt from his book on the south-central Andean province of Huamanga, there was also economic and social differentiation within the "republic of Indians." In addition to his emphasis on the very different experiences of Indian commoners and elites under Spanish rule, Stern shows the bustling and contentious vigor of Huamanga's colonial society, forcing us to reassess the common view of the "isolation" and "timelessness" of Peru's Andean interiors.

In Huamanga, if one saw a gallant figure dressed in rose velvet breeches with fine gold trim, bright doublet beneath a dark velveteen cape from Segovia, broad felt hat, and a pair of good shoes, one probably expected to see the face of a wealthy colonial, or perhaps even a mestizo. Sometimes, however, the face belonged to an Indian. The growing poverty of Andean peoples by the early seventeenth century could lead us to overlook the rise of natives who escaped severe burdens imposed upon most Indians, in some cases climbed the social ladder, and accumulated considerable wealth.

Several studies of colonial Peru have suggested the historical importance of privileged strata within the "republic of Indians." There was an embryonic potential for class divisions among Huamanga's societies before Spanish conquest, but certain institutions stifled their further development. After conquest, the strategic position of Hispanizing *kurakas*, or chiefs, as mediators between natives and colonials intensified incipient contradictions in native society; the post-Incaic alliances caught native elites between traditional roles as protectors of *ayllu* [communal] interests, and new opportunities and demands as

"friends" of the conquistadores. During the crisis of the 1560s, the Taki Onquoy movement pressured collaborators of the colonial regime to purify themselves and renew exclusively Andean loyalties, but the tenuous and guarded relationship of Indian elites to the uprising mirrored their ambivalent, contradictory position. A decade later, Toledo's reforms organized a network of state power to coerce a surplus out of a self-sufficient *ayllu* peasantry; the system worked in part because its power groups incorporated Indian as well as Hispanic lords.

The Indians eventually undermined Toledan *mitas* [forced labor] and tributes, but not the emergence of multiracial power groups. Indeed, judicial politics encouraged mutually beneficial arrangements among native elites and Hispanic patrons who sometimes profited by subverting state-sponsored extractions. The economic boom of the late sixteenth century integrated local societies into a highly commercialized economy; local commodity-circulation patterns induced internal differentiation even further, concentrating Indian resources in fewer hands, and privatizing a proportion of *ayllu* lands. From the first years of conquest, but with increasing force in the seventeenth century, *ayllu* society lost migrants to cities, mines, commercial centers, Spanish patrons, and foreign Indian communities. Some of the migrants learned skills or developed connections that saved them from the fate of poor Indians and enabled them to join the ranks of those who profited from the commercial economy.

The personal strategies and achievements of successful Indians, who assimilated in important ways to Hispanic-mestizo society, bear a close relationship to the broader history of European exploitation and Indian resistance. Their achievements stimulated a process of class differentiation within native society, inserted European-style relationships, motivations, and culture more directly into peasant life, and furthered the shrinkage of traditional Andean rights and resources. The tragedy of Indian success lay in the way it recruited dynamic, powerful, or fortunate individuals to adopt Hispanic styles and relationships, thereby buttressing colonial domination. The achievements of native individuals, in the midst of a society organized to exploit indigenous peoples, educated Indians to view the Hispanic as superior, the Andean as inferior.

Paths to Success

Despite conditions that severely impoverished most natives by the early seventeenth century, a minority managed to accumulate suf-

ficient funds to buy or rent valuable rural and urban property. A sample of fifty-two transactions shows that many Indians who bought or rented lands and homesteads spent sums far beyond the economic horizons of most natives. Fully half (50.0 percent) the purchases cost 40–90 pesos (of 8 *reales*); another fourth (28.3 percent) required 100 pesos or more. These represented large sums for an Indian. The state's annual tribute, a heavy burden for many, amounted to less than ten pesos; an unskilled *asiento* Indian earned perhaps twenty pesos for an entire year's service; an expenditure of thirty pesos to rent a *mitayo* replacement was unrealistic for a poor peasant.[1]

Even by Hispanic standards, some Indian purchases represented significant accumulations. One woman bought part of a fine city lot owned by a distinguished *encomendero* family.[2] The 300 pesos she spent equaled eight or nine months of the profit expected by a master who rented out a skilled slave artisan. Juana Payco and Don Pedro Pomaconxa each bought valuable lands from foreign *ayllus* for 600 pesos. That amount of money sufficed, in most years, to buy a prime African slave. Some transactions, especially purchase or rental of city residences by Indians whose economic base remained in the countryside, fulfilled prestige desires. To establish a respectable residence in Huamanga, one *kuraka* shunned a site in the city's Indian parishes; instead, he rented homes in the finer, more expensive Spanish section.

Even as monetary obligations and debt became increasingly oppressive forces in the lives of poor Indians, an emerging sector of natives accumulated enough liquid wealth to become creditors. The wills of prosperous Indians recorded lists of uncollected petty debts. Native artisans and other "credible" figures served as bondsmen of Indians in debt or in trouble. Some loans were more than petty in size. Lorenzo Pilco, born to a wealthy Indian family in the city of Huamanga, and owner of valuable lands in rural Angaraes, loaned 300 pesos to an impoverished *kuraka*. Pilco eventually had the chief jailed for lack of payment. Significantly, even Spaniards turned to wealthy Indians for credit on occasion. One Spaniard secured a one-year loan of 140 pesos from Doña Juana Méndez; another paid 50 pesos of interest a year on a long-term loan of 700 pesos from Catalina Reinoso, an Indian gentlewoman who owned a vineyard in the Nazca Valley descending from Lucanas to the Pacific coast.

The historical question we must ask is how an emerging sector of wealthy Indians earned such funds and protected themselves from expropriations that confined most natives to a meager existence. The

economic and political means by which a minority of Indians achieved success, in a society that had despoiled most *ayllus* and peasants of the capacity to produce and market a surplus, warrant close examination.

In a thriving commercial economy heavily dependent on artisanal or craft technologies, those who sold skilled services might earn substantial incomes. Experienced mine workers commanded handsome wages in the seventeenth century. Inflated prices controlled by outside merchants, respites from a harsh existence in drinking and gambling, and fraudulent abuses by mine owners often consumed wages quickly. But some Indians probably managed to accumulate savings, by setting aside significant amounts of wages or stealing valuable ores. More attractive than mining were artisanry and transport, relatively independent forms of work for which there was high demand. Huamanga's economy relied heavily on skilled trades and crafts for construction and manufactures, and Indian artisans assumed a prominent role in all kinds of "Hispanic" occupations, as silversmiths, painters and gilders, masons, stonecutters, carpenters, joiners, tanners, tailors, shoemakers, and the like. Martín de Oviedo, a Spaniard with a strong reputation as a "master sculptor" and architect, was hired in 1609 to refurbish the interior of the Dominican church for 4,600 pesos; Oviedo, in turn, subcontracted for Indian carpenters, painters, and gilders to work on the project. An independent Indian craftsman could earn a very respectable income. In two months, a stonecutter could fashion a water wheel worth sixty pesos. Juan Uscamato, a carpenter, earned 150 pesos by agreeing to build a flour mill in six months. His expenses were low, and he probably did not have to work full time on the mill, since the contractor agreed to supply needed materials, including carved stone and iron tools, and six Indian laborers to work under Uscamato.

The *asiento* labor contracts of Huamanga show a dramatic income gap between skilled Indians and unspecialized laboring peons. Artisans hired in *asientos* earned double or triple the wages promised for general service, some 40–60 pesos a year besides subsistence. *Arrieros* (muleteers, drivers of animal trains) earned at least twice as much again, some 80–130 pesos a year. The nonmonetary components of the compensation often included special rights which widened the gap further. One tanner received ten semifinished hides that, in effect, subsidized his independent work. *Arrieros* received a few extra yards of cloth to stock their wares. More important, the drivers' work helped them consolidate independent trading connections and lower their own business costs by transporting commodities on employers' ani-

mals, as in the case of the employer who formally agreed that his hired *arriero* could make "all the trips he wants with [the employer's] animal train."

Concessions such as these mattered because those who engaged in substantial trade or commercial production could accumulate great wealth. Indian merchants, like Spaniards, speculated in commodities. Artisans, unlike *arrieros*, could not pursue commerce full-time, but ambitious craftsmen engaged in varied mercantile transactions on the side. Indians, like Spaniards, carved out private landholdings for commercial production of coca, wine, maize, wheat, vegetables, wool, meat, hides, cheese, and the like. Indeed, Indian entrepreneurs tended to focus their accumulations of private property in the very zones that attracted their Spanish counterparts: the well-located and fertile valleys of the Angaraes-Huanta district, the city of Huamanga and its surrounding valleys, the coca *montaña* [jungles] of eastern Huanta, and, to a lesser extent, fertile pastures and farmlands along the road that cut across Vilcashuamán to Cuzco and Potosí.

Marketable skills and services, commercial production, and trade itself earned Indians considerable revenues, but they do not explain how a successful minority protected its wealth from expropriation. *Ayllus* too had earned very impressive incomes in the sixteenth century, but colonial control made such accumulation increasingly difficult, if not impossible, for most *ayllus* in the seventeenth century. The economic function of the colonial power structure was, after all, to usurp Indian resources and to siphon the surplus of a native society reduced to bare subsistence. *Kurakas* enjoyed greater access to revenues than common households, but redistributive obligations presumably limited the capacity of chiefs to accumulate personal resources while kinfolk slid deeper into poverty. Indeed, the chiefs' personal liability for community obligations, especially tribute and *mita*, sometimes forced them to sell valuable lands or animals, and subjected their wealth to confiscation by *corregidores* [magistrates]. The periodic *composiciones de tierras* permitted colonial judges to award title to "surplus" Indian lands requested by Spanish petitioners.[3] In practice, the land inspections made *ayllu* land tenure a precarious proposition. To avoid dependence on a European overlord, a *forastero* might seek a livelihood in a new Indian community setting.[4] But earning the acceptance of foreign *ayllus* might entail new kinship bonds, or payments of rent for land-use rights, which limited accumulation.

Under these circumstances, earning a respectable income did not, by itself, insure one against impoverishment. Indians could achieve lasting economic success only if their socioeconomic "strategy" shielded them, in part at least, from colonial expropriations and from redistributive obligations to poorer Indians. A key shielding device involved "privatizing" property rights. Individual title to land, recognized by Spanish law, protected the owner from legal confiscations that befell *ayllu* property. Private ownership of property also provided a weapon against overlapping or collective claims by *ayllus* and ethnic groups, especially if the owner accumulated lands in "foreign" zones, i.e., outside the domain traditionally claimed by the Indian's *ayllu* or ethnic relatives. But even within a given *ayllu* or ethnic domain, a process of privatization transferred a proportion of property rights to powerful or wealthy local Indians, and to wealthy outsiders of all races. During the first *composición de tierras*, held in 1594, some of Huamanga's *kurakas* secured private title to extensive land-use rights traditionally allotted them by *ayllus*. A *kuraka* who wished to protect his prestige or to work the lands by calling upon traditional *ayllu* relationships probably could not alienate such lands from collective claims in an absolute sense. But we know that *kurakas* sold or rented some of these lands to outsiders, and that in later generations, children who "inherited" lands from deceased chiefs defended their property rights against Indian relatives. Even if a chief (or his heirs) did not privatize *ayllu* property for his own use, he held authority to sell community lands in order to pay tributes or to hire *mitayo* replacements. Such sales alienated property from ethnic and *ayllu* domains in a more permanent sense. Fertile lands once held by *ayllus* circulated as commodities on a surprising scale in the seventeenth century, especially in dynamic commercial zones of northern Huamanga, and the buyers of valuable property included Indians as well as Spaniards and mixed-bloods.

Another form of protection lay in escaping tribute and *mita* obligations. A household continually drained by contributions to pay *ayllu* tributes or hire *mitayo* replacements could hardly expect to accumulate money sufficient to buy lucrative property, even if it earned a significant monetary income. The colonial regime, however, exempted certain natives from *mita* and tribute, and Spanish law failed to incorporate the large *forastero* population systematically until the eighteenth century.

The evidence suggests that the privilege of exemption brought considerable benefits. Tributary status did not apply to independent women heads of household, and women accounted for over a third

(35.8 percent) of Indian purchases or rentals of property. *Forasteros* and artisans also played a conspicuous role in private accumulations of property. The *forasteros'* ill-defined legal status freed them from *mita* and tribute as long as they escaped tax collectors sent from their original communities; artisans, both village and urban, held legal exemption from the *mita*. Finally, major *kurakas*, municipal functionaries (mostly officers of the Indian *cabildo*, or town council), and lay assistants of Catholic priests all enjoyed exemptions from *mita* and some of them, from tribute. A few earned modest salaries as well. Within *ayllu* society, therefore, appointments to municipal and church posts distributed privileges which allowed some people to accumulate resources while others eked out a bare existence or fell into debt.

A third form of shielding, and one that increased opportunities for economic gain dramatically, exploited privileged ties to the colonial power structure. Within *ayllu* society especially, access to power often proved a decisive determinant of revenues and obligations. Powerful *ayllus* and favored relatives of *kurakas* paid lighter tributes than others, and the *kurakas* themselves levied extra tributes. The Toledan regime had reorganized the countryside by establishing a series of multiracial power groups, with a Spanish *corregidor* at the center, but including a contingent of Indian functionaries and assistants. The revamped Indian power structure drew its members from important *kuraka* families, socially mobile commoners eager to benefit by association with Hispanic power, and (in the seventeenth century, at least) a few *forasteros* integrated into local *ayllu* societies. Judicial politics further cemented alliances between Indian elites and Hispanic patrons. The assistance of Hispanic patrons brought with it a quid pro quo: loyalty to the interests of "friends," cooperation in local schemes of extraction. In effect, local alliances assimilated an elite fraction of *ayllu* society to the Hispanic power structure, and thus to the conversion of political advantage into private wealth. The liability of *kurakas* for community tribute and *mita*, for example, theoretically subjected chiefs to confiscations of wealth that might have impoverished them in the seventeenth century. Some confiscations did indeed occur, but often *kurakas* enlisted the aid of *corregidores* and priests to "prove" that *mita* and tribute quotas had been set too high. Instead of losing resources to pay for tributes in arrears, a *kuraka* could earn thousands of pesos by joining Hispanic friends in mutually profitable schemes, such as putting-out systems to sell cloth or rope woven by *ayllus*. The burden of such schemes and the reduced quotas of legal *mitas* and tributes

fell most heavily on the least powerful and poorest segments of native society.

The differentiation of native society into rich and poor reflected the ability of a minority to free itself from constraints that bound most Indians. We ought not underestimate the difficulty of such achievements, especially for natives who did not inherit advantages by birth into powerful or wealthy Indian families. For the great majority the road to success was closed. Daring decisions did not guarantee prosperity. Emigration from the society of one's relatives, perhaps the boldest step an Indian might take, led some individuals to success, but prosperous emigrants were a minority. Most *forasteros* lived a more modest existence as *yanaconas*, day laborers, petty producers, community peasants integrated by marriage into foreign *ayllus*, vagrants, and the like.[5] Artisanry exerted a special appeal precisely because it offered the surest path to economic improvement and independence. Prospective apprentices flocked to cities to find artisans willing to teach them a trade in exchange for their labors.

Those who earned relatively high incomes, of course, did not automatically accumulate "private" resources shielded from overlapping or redistributive claims by poorer relatives. Women heads of household, for example, enjoyed legal exemptions from *mitas* and tributes, and participated heavily in commercial production and trade. But ties of kinship and obligation meant—in some cases, at least—that apparently "private" resources in fact helped to shore up the faltering economic base of poorer kinfolk, including male tributaries. In these cases, "success" was less individualized, more subject to a web of overlapping rights that redistributed accumulations.

By the seventeenth century, however, an emerging strata of ambitious Indians superseded such obstacles and accumulated impressive personal wealth. As we shall see, the success of these natives changed the very texture of Indian life.

The Social Significance of Indian Hispanism

Above all else, Indian success rested upon one's capacity to imitate Hispanic strategies of accumulation or to develop close ties with Hispanic-mestizo society. The material well-being of these Indians no longer depended, as it had for their ancestors, on their ability to mobilize traditional forms of property, reciprocal obligation, and loyalty within an ancient family of *ayllu* and ethnic relatives. Their economic welfare

came to depend primarily upon their capacity to privatize interests in a commercial setting: to accumulate private property, exploit commercial opportunities, and convert political influence, service, or privilege into liquid wealth. For these Indians, rural commodity circulation and a certain monetization of obligations represented an opportunity, not a burden or a symptom of declining self-sufficiency. The penetration of commercial capital into the countryside created opportunities to buy lands, to extend commercial networks, to consolidate influence as creditors to those trapped in a quagmire of tributes, corvées, subsistence problems, and debts.

A certain Hispanization of property and relationships, linked to the emergence of successful natives, thus began to remold the internal structure of Indian society. The process of Hispanization, like the internal differentiation it mirrored, was only partial or incomplete. *Ayllu* reciprocities and property rights still constituted an important resource for many Indians. But those who continued to depend exclusively upon "traditional" rights were condemned to poverty, and by the early seventeenth century, relations between rich and poor Indians began to take on a more "Hispanic" tonality and texture. Wealthy Indians no longer depended upon the collective claims of *ayllus* and ethnic groups for access to property; they acquired private title to the best Indian lands, both in *ayllu* homelands and among foreign Indians. Commercial transactions and debt forged new bonds and dependencies superseding those of kinship and reciprocal obligation. Wealthy and powerful natives looked beyond traditional Andean reciprocities for access to labor, and resorted to Hispanic methods of labor exploitation. Indian miners, coca planters, and *hacendados* attached dependent laborers to their properties and hired temporary workers for wages. On occasion, a prominent Indian even secured an official *mita* allotment! In 1598, Viceroy Luis de Velasco granted the Indian Doña Isabel Asto, a rich miner and widow of a Spaniard, sixty *mitayos* to work her mines in Huancavelica. In one of ten (10.3 percent) *asiento* labor contracts in Huamanga, the hired Indian worked for an Indian master. The employers, some of them artisans hiring apprentices, were clearly men and women of considerable means. One Indian merchant could afford to pay a hired *arriero* 100 pesos a year in wages. Another employer, Catalina Cocachimbo, recruited a *yanacona* by lending an Indian 150 pesos. Adopting both the form and content used by Hispanic colonials, she contracted the peon to work for her at 20 pesos a

year to repay the debt; after one year, he would receive a plot of land to grow his own food.

In June 1630, for example, the Indians and chiefs of Guaychao had to sell valuable community lands to an outsider to raise funds. Yet in the very same month Pedro Alopila, a local *ayllu* Indian, bought for himself some twelve hectares of irrigable maize lands from a Spanish landowner. Internal differentiation opened the door to new relationships far removed from traditional bonds among *originarios*.[6] Consider, for example, the career of Juana Marcaruray, a woman who retained her *ayllu* presence and identity until her death. Within the region of her *ayllu* homeland, she accumulated seven private properties (including two coca fields), indebted various members of the community, and collected rent from Indian tenants on her property.

The case of Don Juan Uybua and Sebastián Cabana, *ayllu* Indians of the same village, is also revealing. Uybua, a local *kuraka*, paid a debt of 90 pesos owed by Cabana, who was accused of losing four cows and three horses. But Uybua's act hardly represented the traditional generosity expected of a chief bound by long-term reciprocities with kinfolk. The two Indians apparently belonged to different (though related) *ayllus*, and Uybua used the debt to make a typically "Hispanic" arrangement. To "repay" the loan, Cabana had to agree to a labor *asiento* binding him to Uybua for almost seven years! Uybua would placate the indebted peon's *kurakas* by paying them the annual tribute owed by Cabana.

The emerging Indian elite of the seventeenth century thus embraced strategies and relationships drawn from the dominant, exploiting sector of society. Increasingly, Hispanic models of advancement offered the only way out of confines that shackled most Indians. Those whose personal success required a Hispanization, however partial, of their economic lives included *originarios* as well as *forasteros*, socially mobile commoners as well as *kurakas*, permanent city dwellers as well as Indians who maintained homes and bases in both city and countryside. Not surprisingly, the material culture and technology of Indian production bore witness to the process of Hispanization. Artisans used Spanish tools and materials in their shops; ranchers raised herds of cows and sheep; farmers harnessed plows to oxen to till wheat fields. To a certain extent, the spread of Hispanic material culture was more generalized than that suggested here, particularly as growing numbers of Indians produced "Spanish" commodities such as eggs or beef,

or served as peons to Spanish overlords. But the material "Hispanization" of Indian production was more closely associated with wealthy Indians, including chiefs.

The spread of Hispanic "culture," moreover, was not confined to resources used in material production. Wealthy Indians bought and used the accoutrements of cultured Spanish folk. They wore fine clothes (made in Europe), traveled on horse and saddle, bought furniture, jewelry, and trinkets for their homes, enjoyed wine with meals, and owned Spanish firearms and swords. The successful (or pretentious) appropriated the Spanish titulature of Don or Doña, and acquired urban predilections. Even if their livelihood kept them in the countryside much of the time, wealthy Indians established second homes in which to live and do business in Huamanga or other cities. A few cultured natives even read and wrote Spanish. In 1621, the Jesuits opened the Royal School of San Francisco de Borja, a boarding school in Cuzco that taught Spanish language, religion, and culture to sons of major *kurakas* from Huamanga, Cuzco, and Arequipa. The new school represented a small part of a much broader educational process, formal and informal, long underway, which created a growing sector of *ladino* Indians. The *ladinos* were people of Indian parentage whose culture, demeanor, and lifeways took on a more mestizo or even Spanish character. They knew the ways of Spanish-mestizo society, dressed in nontraditional garb, understood and spoke Spanish, and in some cases even cut their hair. In cities and mining centers especially, *ladino* traits spread through the Indian population far beyond the successful, prospering elite. But the most "Hispanic," least "mestizo" or "Indian," of the *ladinos* were those whose socioeconomic stature allowed them to buy fine clothes, mix in Spanish circles, get an education, and the like.

Apparently, the successful valued their Hispanism highly. Juana Hernández, owner of at least eighty-five hectares of wheat and corn fields near Julcamarca (Angaraes), proudly called herself "a *ladina* Indian, and very intelligent in Spanish language." Indians spent considerable sums—200 pesos for a suit of clothes, 50 pesos for a gun—to collect Spanish items. Don Fernando Ataurimachi of Huamanguilla (Huanta), descendant of the Inca Huayna Capac, related by kinship to Spaniards, and owner of urban property and irrigated corn lands, collected Spanish guns, lances, halberds, and swords. The proud Ataurimachi made a point of showing off his collection at great public festivals.

Some of the Hispanizing Indians took Christian religion quite seriously. The defeat of Taki Onqoy, of course, made plain that all Indians needed to avoid the wrath of powerful Christian gods. To placate the gods and their priests, peasants submitted to a thin overlay of Christian ritual. Catholicism might have enjoyed somewhat greater acceptance among city Indians cut off from rural kin networks and ancestor-gods. But the evidence suggests a striking enthusiasm on the part of wealthy Indians in both city and countryside. Ataurimachi of Huamanguilla married his Indian wife in a Christian ceremony supervised by a Catholic priest. Successful Indians led the native *cofradías* [Catholic lay associations], sought Christian burial in places of honor—"inside the church next to the pulpit"—and had masses said for their souls. Some donated lands, animals, and money to the church, or set up ecclesiastical benefices to look after their souls. Some Indians, of course, had good reason to profess Christianity; they had climbed in social and economic station by serving Catholic priests as sextons (*sacristanes*), choir leaders (*cantores*), and the like.

But others, too, developed close bonds with Christian gods and their representatives on earth. Catalina Pata, a city Indian of Huamanga, bought a huge crucifix that stood a yard and a half tall in her home. Her son, a wealthy artisan, donated lands to the Augustinians "on the condition that the day I die they accompany me . . . and give me a burial inside their church and sing a mass [for my soul]." The will of Don Diego Quino Guaracu, a minor chief of Andahuaylas, named Friar Lucas de Sigura executor of the Indian's estate. Quino gave the priest, apparently a close friend, control of a handsome ecclesiastical benefice of lands sufficient to support nine or ten peasant families. In addition, Quino ordered that his daughter be raised in Huamanga's convent of Santa Clara, "where she might grow up civilized and Christian." For these Indians, Christianization—which by no means excluded continuance of traditional paganisms—constituted far more than a superficial overlay. Like the secular symbols of Hispanism, Christian religion expressed relationships and aspirations that deeply touched their lives.

In a society where "cultural" and "economic" dimensions of life interpenetrated one another deeply, Indian Hispanism had profound symbolic importance. Andean culture esteemed cloth highly as a ritual article and as an emblem of ethnic affiliation and social position. Natives who wore fine Hispanic clothes vividly expressed an aspiration to move beyond a condemned Indian past and merge into the upper strata of colonial society. Andean thought interpreted "religious" re-

lationships as a mutual exchange that provided material reward to those who served the gods. Christian devotion by wealthy Indians symbolized their attempt to nurture a mutually beneficial interchange with the Hispanic world, its gods (including saints) as well as its people.

Symbolically, then, cultural Hispanism expressed the socioeconomic orientation of an emerging Indian elite whose acquisition of private property, pursuit of commercial gain, and social relationships tended to differentiate them from the Andean peasantry and to assimilate them to an exploitative class of aristocrat-entrepreneurs. Even in the case of modestly successful Indians (small farmers, urban artisans, and the like) who did not develop direct relationships with *ayllu* peasants, dependent retainers, or contracted laborers, their differentiation as a class of small independent producers represented a drain on the resources and labor-power available to *ayllu* society. And the most impressive success stories tended to create a strata of "Europeans" with Indian skin and faces, a provincial elite whose Andean heritage and connections enabled it to inject Hispanic-style relationships, motivations, and culture all the more deeply into the fabric of Indian life.

But the ties between Hispanism and Indian success were sometimes more direct than those implied by mere imitation of European models, or a reproduction of Hispanic styles and relationships within native society. One recalls that Doña Isabel Asto, Don Fernando Ataurimachi, and Don Diego Quino Guaracu all had Spanish relatives or friends. As we have seen, ambitious Indians sought Spanish allies or benefactors for protection or advancement; Spanish individuals and power groups, in turn, enhanced their authority and economic potential by cultivating a clientele of Indian allies and functionaries. Success drew an Indian into Hispanic-mestizo circles, and oppression created desires to find a better life by associating with non-Indian sectors of society. A minority of Indians developed close social bonds outside native society. They bought Indian lands on behalf of colonials, donated or willed property to non-Indian friends, and appointed Spaniards executors of their estates. In a number of cases, the bonds between Indians and Spaniards even included marriage and kinship.

To the Spanish elites, marriage to native women from influential or wealthy families brought social connections and dowries. Even a high elite family consented to such arrangements if the Indian woman enjoyed a sufficiently noble background. The descendants of Antonio de Oré, an esteemed pre-Toledan *encomendero,* proudly documented their aristocratic Spanish genealogy. The Oré pride, however, did not prevent Antonio's son Gerónimo from marrying an Inca noblewoman.

More often, lesser or aspiring elites sought to gain or extend footholds in the countryside of Huanta, Angaraes, and Vilcashuamán by marrying Indian women. Juan Ramírez Romero had a notoriously exploitative reputation when he served as lieutenant of a rural *corregidor* from 1601 to 1606. This ambitious *hacendado* and "citizen" of Vilcashuamán, owner of extensive ranches, farms, and sugar fields, probably made his first inroads by marrying Doña María Cusiocllo. Ramírez observed that "my father-in-law," a local *kuraka,* had given him much of the property as dowry. Not far away, an Indian-white couple, Doña Beatriz Guarcay Ynquillay and Don Cristóbal de Gamboa, owned sixty hectares of land donated by her brother, chief *kuraka* of Vischongo, "to cancel his sister's rights . . . in the property of their father Don Juan Pomaquiso."

For some Indian women, marriage or informal conjugal relations with outsiders had its attractions. The daughters of Indian chiefs may have had little choice in the matter, but wealthy or ambitious women shared the Hispanic orientation of their male counterparts. María López, an Indian, acquired several urban properties in Huamanga during her marriage to a respectable Spanish resident. When her husband died, she established an informal relationship and had a child with Gaspar de Arriola, a wealthy "citizen" of Huamanga "to whom I am much obligated for good works." Arriola contributed valuable lands to the support of López and their illegitimate son. More humble Indian women, too, had reason to pursue relations with outsiders. Young males seemed to experience a kind of life crisis on the threshold of marriage and tributary responsibilities; some fled and swelled the *forastero* population. Young women facing the grim burdens of *ayllu* life must have experienced crises and tensions of their own, especially if they had a chance to "escape" by marrying outsiders—*forastero* Indians, free blacks, mixed-bloods, or Spaniards. Among the *originario* population, women usually outnumbered men anyway. Some women made the jump and did well. Juana Curiguamán, for example, married a free mulatto, Alonso de Paz; not far from her homeland in Soras, they bought a modest hacienda worth 600–700 pesos. Describing the situation, Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala of Lucanas complained that Indian women "no longer love Indians but rather Spaniards, and they become big whores." His remark expressed male resentment; it

underestimated the importance of force and sexual assault in many Indian-white relationships and ignored the women whose lives and resources remained bonded to Indian kinfolk (of both sexes). Nevertheless, Poma's exaggeration corresponded to a very real social pattern, to a Hispanic allure that attracted both female and male.

At its highest levels, Indian success signified a fuller emergence of class relationships within seventeenth-century native society. Hispanism was a path to success for a small minority, but it also tended to transform the prosperous into foreigners—people whose economic relations, social bonds, and cultural symbols differentiated them from poorer, more "Indian" counterparts and imparted a Hispanic-mestizo dimension to their identities. In any given rural terrain, the emerging provincial elite included a strong component of "outsiders" anyway—*forastero* Indians, Spanish colonials and officials, mestizos (some of them heirs of Indian-white marriages among local elites), occasionally a black or mulatto. But even a local *ayllu* Indian acquired a more alien character if success violated community norms or assimilated the native to outside exploiters. Poma observed an erosion of major *kurakas'* legitimacy among kinfolk; social climbers who had usurped chieftainships from rightful heirs, and chiefs whose social and economic activities allied them with hated colonials "are no longer obeyed nor respected." Consider also the will of Juana Marcaruray, a wealthy *ayllu* Indian with no children. Marcaruray left her considerable estate to her friend Doña Mariana de Balaguera, wife of the municipal standard bearer of Huamanga, "in view of [my] having received very many good works, worthy of greater reward, from her household." Traditionally, property rights would have reverted to *ayllu* relatives if the deceased left no spouse or children.

Success tended to draw the most dynamic and powerful members of native society—*originarios* as well as *forasteros*, villagers as well as city folk—into the world of aristocrat-entrepreneurs, and thereby widened the social basis of colonial exploitation. The question we may ask is whether this tendency met with any kind of resistance. As we shall see, considerable tension and conflict marred the achievements of successful Indians.

Strife, Tension, and Purification

In a society where ethnic loyalties continued to set communities against one another, *forasteros* who intruded on *ayllu* domains contended with

hostilities that sometimes flared into open conflict. Catalina Puscotilla, an "Indian hacendada," held 130 hectares of prime land near the village of Espíritu Santo, midway between the urban markets of Huancavelica and Huamanga. The zone's waters, ecology, and location made it especially important for commercial agriculture, and Puscotilla's Indian husband had agreed in 1625 to pay the Crown 298 pesos (of 8 reales) for legal title to the land. The local Quiguares Indians bitterly disputed the award of valuable property to outsiders, however, and a classic hacienda-community conflict festered for decades. In the 1640s Puscotilla, now a widow, was still fending off the Quiguares, as well as a mestizo rival who had entered the fray. Lorenzo Pilco, a wealthy city Indian and "master shoemaker," encountered similar problems in the countryside. To end litigation with the Angaraes Indians of Pata, Pilco resorted to an expedient well known to Spanish entrepreneurs. He simply paid the Indians, who could ill afford protracted legal struggles anyway, seventy pesos to withdraw their suit.

Outsiders could gain more acceptance by integrating themselves into community life and responsibilities, but such integration gave local Indians a means to exert pressure for redistribution of wealth. In 1642 Clemente de Cháves, a *ladino* from Huamanga, spent thirty pesos to buy a modest amount of land from a wealthy *ayllu* Indian of Huanta. The fact that Chaves married and settled in the area, and "helps [the community] serve the mitas of Huancavelica" undoubtedly stabilized his presence. A wealthier *forastero*, Don Diego de Rojas, married Teresa Cargua of Lucanas Andamarcas. Rojas apparently won the esteem of his new kinfolk, for he served as chief of their small *ayllu*. Acceptance of Rojas's leadership probably derived from his willingness to submit to local reciprocities that demanded "generosity" on the part of chiefs. An Indian as wealthy and powerful as a Lorenzo Pilco, who had a *kuraka* jailed for failure to pay a debt, might shun obligations that limited one's capacity to accumulate or privatize wealth. But if he did, the intruder risked the same conflicts and litigations that afflicted Spanish entrepreneurs.

Conflict between *ayllu* Indians and wealthy *forasteros* is readily understandable, but Poma's observation that *kurakas* lost "respect" as they were integrated into the colonial political and economic structure suggests the development of more precarious, forced relations between chiefs and "their" people. At times, loss of confidence in the reciprocal exchanges that bound chiefs and *ayllu* peasants erupted in outright refusals to obey an "illegitimate" request. In Vilcashuamán, for ex-

ample, some Papres and Chilques *kurakas* and Spanish priests decided that *ayllus* ought to plant nearly 300 hectares of wheat to earn funds for local churches and *cofradías*. When the peasants discovered that they would not be paid for their work, resistance grew so fierce that the project had to be abandoned. A chief who lost legitimacy among kinfolk faced serious problems beyond those of simple disobedience. Emigration of *ayllu* Indians might increase; complaints to Spanish officials might undermine ethnic or *ayllu* authority; rivals to a chieftainship might secure a following and embroil local society in a civil war.

A new tension thus entered the relationship of major chiefs and *ayllu* peasants. To shore up the legitimacy that made *ayllu* households responsive to their requests, chiefs had to demonstrate loyalties and perform services for *ayllus* and ethnic groups. Probably such services included skillful leadership in judicial politics and other defenses against extractive relations; "generosity" in redistributing wealth to poorer kinfolk; enforcement of a "fair" distribution of burdens and rights within the community of producer-relatives; and symbolic expressions of solidarity with *ayllu* and ethnic relatives. These services enhanced prestige among kin, but they also limited the degree to which a chief could privatize resources and interests, or function as a reliable partner of colonial power groups. The structural position of ambitious chiefs thus embodied a deep contradiction. To operate effectively, with minimal force, required that chiefs earn the confidence of kin, but too zealous a defense of *ayllu* interests handicapped their ability to accumulate wealth or pursue private gain. *Kurakas* were conspicuous among the Indians whose "Hispanic" success differentiated them from the seventeenth-century peasantry, but their success eroded some of the "influence" associated with traditional reciprocity relationships. The result was a more strained, suspicious relationship in which conflict, coercion, and economic power acquired added importance.

Similar tensions probably accompanied the success of *originarios* who never held an important chieftainship. In the final analysis, *ayllu* Indians did not readily accept the legitimacy of a complete alienation of resources from the fabric of community life and authority. Wealthy *ayllu* Indians, *kurakas* or not, faced a network of relatives, *ayllus*, and ethnic groups who claimed overlapping rights to "private" lands and revenues. Indeed, *kurakas* sometimes used their position as spokesmen of the community to expropriate or redistribute the "private" property

of wealthy *ayllu* rivals, including women. *Ayllu* enemies countered with legal suits to protect their resources. Such conflicts exacerbated the erosion of the chiefs' moral authority and hardly lessened resentments created by networks of private interest and wealth, much of it beyond the control of *ayllu* society. Beyond a certain point, privatization of resources alienated not just the resources attached to the owner, but the owner too, from *ayllu* Indians.

By the early seventeenth century, then, the success of a minority amidst growing pauperization created new strains in native Andean life. Indian Hispanism—as a socioeconomic strategy and as a set of cultural symbols—constituted for some a path to economic success and at least the pretense of social respectability. But to those left behind, especially the *ayllu* peasantry, it represented a powerful, oppressive force in the very heart of rural society. Hispanism symbolized the conversion of Indian society's foremost figures into partners of colonial rule and exploitation, a widening split of interests, loyalties, and orientations that accompanied differentiation into rich and poor. It symbolized, too, a loss of "confidence" that touched all sectors of Andean society. Poor Indians understood very well the temptation to escape or soften burdens by allying with the world of the colonials, in a search for personal gain that weakened community solidarity and confirmed the superiority of the Hispanic over the Andean.

At moments of crisis, these tensions exploded in nativist outbursts that sought to purge Andean society of Hispanic-Christian influence. The data available on these internal convulsions is extremely scarce, but the Jesuits recorded one such instance in 1613 when an epidemic swept western Huamanga (the Castrovirreyna-Huancavelica zone settled by the Huachos and Yauyos peoples). In this case, at least, Indian nativism generated fierce loyalties and violence. Indians not only killed two Catholic priests, but also one of their own chiefs. Quickly, Catholic *extirpadores* [extirpators] of the idolatry dragged 150 pagan priests to the city of Castrovirreyna for the standard public spectacle and proceedings: whippings and haircuts for the worst offenders, a bonfire to destroy Andean articles of worship (including the *huacas*, or idols, themselves), "confession" and eventual rehabilitation of the idolaters. But some of the offenders refused to submit and staged a spectacular show of defiance. Within five days, thirty of "the most obstinate" leaders, "exasperated and desperate," had killed themselves "with poison that they took by their own hand."

As in the 1560s, when millenarian upheaval inflamed Huamanga,

the *huacas* served as a medium of popular protest and calls for change. In the Taki Onqoy movement, the Andean gods had literally "seized" the bodies of Indians, transforming previously uninfluential natives into authoritative voices of angry gods. This time, the *huacas* voiced popular impulses by appearing to a variety of people in visions and dreams. "Three times they appeared in public to many people, and preached and taught them what to do." The *huacas* rebuked the Indians for supposed disloyalty and neglect of the native deities, who had taken vengeance by sending disease and hard times to the land. And they issued a series of anti-Christian "commandments." The Indians "should not recognize any other god except their *huacas*" and should know "that everything that the Christians teach is false." The natives should perform the traditional rites and services owed to ancestor-gods and should avoid any collaboration with Spaniards, who were "enemies of the *huacas*." The Indians "ought not go to serve the Spaniards, nor deal with them, nor communicate, nor ask [their] advice . . . unless forced to."

The qualification "unless forced to" conceded a harsh fact of life. In the context of the early seventeenth century, the colonial power structure was too secure to be smashed or challenged overtly. But the Indians should not collaborate willingly. Instead, they should close ranks around a purifying hatred of colonials and Christian influence. "The day that a cleric or priest leaves town," ordered the *huacas*, "[the Indians] should catch an all-black dog and drag him along all the streets and spots where the priest had walked." Afterwards, the natives should kill the animal at the river, "and where [the river parts into] two branches they should throw in [the body], in order that . . . they purify the places walked by the priest." In Andean culture, the juncture of two streams had special ritual significance as a symbol of perfection or the achievement of "balanced" social relationships.

What distinguished the religious turmoil of 1613 was not its "idolatrous" nature, but rather its intense nativism—an attempt to wipe village society clean of Hispanic-Christian influence. Idolatry itself was neither exceptional nor especially anti-Hispanic. Huamanga's Indians had long adhered to traditional religious practices, sometimes concealed beneath an overlay of Christian symbols and holidays. From an Andean point of view, "pagan" traditions balanced relationships with ancestor-gods who vitally affected the material welfare of the gods' children. Most Indians, therefore, could scarcely abandon their service to Andean gods. At crucial moments in the ritual calendar or life cycle,

alcohol and coca lowered inhibitions and "the most Christian [Indian], even if he [could] read and write, [chant] a rosary, and dressed like a Spaniard," reverted to Andean paganisms. Indeed, successful or Hispanized native elites, including lay assistants of Catholic priests, often led traditional religious practices. This form of idolatry, though it sometimes expressed a muted hostility to Christian gods, tended to encourage coexistence and eventual interpenetration of Andean and Hispanic gods, symbols, and practices. In this sense, it promoted a syncretic religious culture through which Hispanizing Indian elites could maintain traditional sources of prestige and influence among kinfolk, while pursuing strategies and relationships drawing them ever more tightly into the world of Hispanic exploiters.

The nativist idolatry that erupted in 1613, on the other hand, promoted fiercely aggressive anti-Hispanic sentiments, and spoke directly to the internal crisis symbolized by Indian Hispanism. For syncretism or coexistence, it substituted internal purification. For tradition led by a native elite, it substituted visions and dreams beyond the control of local authority. Before affirming the prestige of Hispanized Indians, it first put their loyalties on trial. At bottom, nativist currents and outbursts represented a protest against internal trends that sapped the strength and unity of Andean society. The message of anti-Hispanism, we ought to remember, was directed at Indians, not Spaniards. The *huacas'* commandments called upon all natives to reject the temptation to forsake the Andean for the Hispanic, in a quest for personal success that weakened community solidarity and confidence in the adequacy of Andean tradition. The most pointed targets of such "commands," however, were those who had already made such a choice. To regain the favor of the *huacas*—and of poor peasants—successful natives would have to drop Hispanic aspirations that converted them into willing partners of colonial enemies. By reaffirming a purer loyalty to native Andean relationships, successful natives could demonstrate solidarity with the more "Indian" peasantry. Those who rejected the call of the *huacas* risked extreme alienation from local Indian society, and even violence. Nativists turned against ethnic elites who shied away from religious purification and in one case poisoned "a *kuraka* of theirs, a good Christian, for not coming to their rites nor wanting to worship their idols."

But murder remained the exception rather than the rule. Among the *originarios*, at least, a good many elites responded to the pressure of local sentiment and participated in the condemnation of their

Hispanic-Christian ways. The threat of social alienation could become a tool of resistance that conditioned social and economic behavior. Indeed, to the extent that *ayllu* peasants could mobilize such a tool to redistribute the resources of successful Indians, they placed limits on the process of privatization and internal differentiation reshaping rural life. But why, we may ask, should a notable fraction of the successful Indians adopting "Hispanic" strategies and relationships prove so vulnerable to the threat of alienation from Andean gods and peoples?

Between Two Worlds

One answer, at first sight adequate, lies in the realm of physical safety and material interest. Indians feared antagonizing Andean gods who ruled over one's health, economic well-being, and the like. Equally important, many successful Indians retained important economic ties in the *ayllu* countryside. Presumably, they could pursue those interests and protect their persons more effectively if they built loyalties and cooperative relationships, or at least avoided gratuitous antagonisms. Social isolation, beyond a certain point, invited violence, disruptive conflicts, and perhaps expulsion from valuable property. Even *forasteros* assumed relationships and obligations that stabilized their presence. Successful *originarios* depended upon "traditional" rights and obligations for some part of their access to resources and labor. A *kuraka* who enjoyed prestige among "his" people could set up a lucrative putting-out system with little trouble. A chief who had lost the "respect" or confidence of *ayllu* households, on the other hand, contended with uncooperative, resistant people. By this logic, those Indians who depended upon a certain esteem among *ayllu* peasants to maintain or enhance their material well-being could not afford to ignore pressures to participate in the nativist idolatries of an aroused peasantry.

Yet this answer is true only up to a certain point. After all, the direction of change limited the material vulnerability of wealthy Indians to declining esteem. An Indian elite that controlled considerable wealth and had integrated itself into provincial power groups enjoyed the same weapons of coercion and economic domination held by colonial aristocrat-entrepreneurs. They had powerful friends and relatives, and sufficient wealth to contract laborers, recruit dependent clients and retainers, accumulate property independent of *ayllu* control, invest in commerce, indebt (and jail) poor Indians, and the like.

Indeed, deteriorating self-sufficiency and commercial penetration of their communities left peasants dependent on wealthy superiors of all races for money, subsistence, credit, and protection. As wealthy Indians developed "Hispanic" patterns of accumulation, they emancipated their *economic* lives from the esteem of kinfolk. The wealthiest Indians could indeed afford to withdraw themselves from the traditional burden of prestige and reciprocal obligation, and some in fact did.

But others did not. The structural position of successful Indians, as a group, was laden with a deep contradiction that inhibited their social acceptance among Spaniards and Indians alike, and generated ambivalent loyalties and identities. As an emerging class, the successful Indians held interests and aspirations joining them to the colonial Hispanic world whose social, economic, and cultural patterns they emulated. But the stain of their racial origins linked them to the Indian peasantry and generated social barriers that normally prevented their complete merger into Hispanic society and culture. Ruling classes tend to consider those whose labor they exploit as "lazy" or inherently inferior. In a colonial situation, where class relationships have their genesis in the conquest of one people by another, this characterization applies to entire castes defined by their racial and cultural origins, in this case the "republic of Indians." The achievements of an Indian minority, judged by the Spaniards' own standards, flew in the face of the natives' supposedly inherent degradation. Dynamic Indians competed with Spaniards for land, labor, and profits; they recast themselves in the trappings of Hispanic culture and found Spanish suitors, allies, and friends. In some cases, they even mastered reading and writing skills known by only a minority of Spaniards. These wealthy and acculturated Indians flagrantly violated the world view and psychology of colonialism.

The Spanish response to *ladinos*, elites, and social climbers was, therefore, highly contradictory. On the one hand, colonial entrepreneurs and officials pursued the contacts they needed to exploit or control the Indian countryside. Their natural allies and friends were powerful, wealthy, and ambitious Indians. But dynamic Indian figures also disturbed the racial hierarchy that legitimated colonial exploitation and entitled all whites—even those who could not break into high elite circles—to a respectable social and economic position. Hence acculturated or wealthy natives also aroused the hostility and contempt heaped upon pretenders who deny their "true" origins. (It is true that money or wealth could help one surmount racial barriers, but the

economic success of many Indians, even if impressive and disturbing to racial hierarchies, was nonetheless modest when measured by the standards of high elite circles of Spanish colonial society.)

In general, then, successful Indians could not simply abandon their racial origins and find social acceptance and identification in a Hispanic world. But strong ambivalences also colored relationships with the bulk of Indian society. On the one hand, poor Indians "needed" wealthier, more acculturated counterparts. Their wealth could shore up deteriorating household and *ayllu* economies or save an Indian debtor from jail. Their cultural knowledge of Hispanic society could strengthen juridical and other defenses against European enemies or establish contacts that might serve the community. In addition, poor Indians probably looked upon successful natives with a certain amount of pride; like Spaniards, they understood that Indian dynamism provided a symbolic counterpoint to stereotypes condemning natives to inferiority and subordination. In certain respects, then, a wealthy *ladino* whose loyalties and commitments joined him or her to Indian society could prove to be an exceptionally valuable and popular leader.

But there, alas, was the rub—in the question of loyalties and commitments. A widening gulf of suspicion, tension, and conflict accompanied the differentiation of Indian society into rich and poor, and for very good reason. Success assimilated the most powerful and dynamic fraction of Indian society to an exploitative class of aristocrat-entrepreneurs; the more modest success stories often represented a drain from *ayllu* society of needed people, skills, and resources, and weakened its internal solidarity. The cultural Hispanism of ambitious Indians expressed their weakening commitment to an onerous Andean heritage and their conspicuous aspiration to blend into the dominant sectors of colonial society. Thus even as poor Indians "needed" their more Hispanized counterparts and might take some pride in their achievements, they lost confidence in the loyalties of a new, more alien Indian elite. One response, especially against *forasteros*, was open conflict. But another, probably more widespread, was more subtle. Social pressure forced wealthy Indians to demonstrate their loyalties to the people to whom they "belonged," or else suffer an awkward, alienated relationship governed by colonial rules of coercion and economic domination.

The Indian elite, especially its poorer and more rural segments, was vulnerable to the pressure of social ostracism precisely because contradictions of class and race blocked their fuller acceptance into Spanish society. The structural position of *ladinos* suspended them between two social worlds, Hispanic and Andean, without fully welcoming them into either. Somewhat ill at ease in Spanish circles, yet estranged or suspect in peasant society, at least some acculturated Indians endured considerable psychic strain and inner conflict. We know, for example, that Andean *huacas* haunted "Christian" Indians in dreams and visions, sometimes for years. Often the native gods first presented themselves to both men and women as attractive sexual partners luring the unfaithful to return to Andean loyalties. Indians whose "Hispanic" wealth, socioeconomic strategies, and aspirations tended to differentiate them from the peasantry nevertheless found that they could not make a final break from Indian society. At least some continued to search for esteem or social acceptance among Indians and responded to pressures to demonstrate loyalty to Andean society.

And on occasion, a popular hero emerged from the ranks of the fortunate and powerful. Don Cristóbal de León, son of a middle-level *kuraka* in Lucanas Andamarcas, was a cultured *ladino:* Spanish in dress and hairstyle, Christian in religion, and known for his learning and ability. Given his political and economic privileges and his acquired culture, León was in a position to integrate himself into the provincial power group exploiting the local peasantry or to leave for a respectable life in a Spanish city. But León departed from conventional patterns and incurred the wrath of local colonials. León continued to live in his *ayllu* homeland, opposed drafts of peasant laborers to transport wine from Pacific coastal valleys across Lucanas to Cuzco, and condemned putting-out arrangements run by *kurakas* and *corregidores* to sell cloth in lucrative markets. At one point, he even set out to Lima to denounce local abuses before the viceroy. The local *corregidor* imprisoned León, "punished" him, and threatened to end the matter by hanging him. The incident marked the first of several confrontations between León and local *corregidores.* In 1612, a *corregidor* and visiting priest finally killed the persistent troublemaker. Significantly, other chiefs and notables had avoided helping León out of his scrapes.

The tragedy of Indian success stemmed ultimately from the way it secured the participation of a defeated people in its own oppression. The colonial regime rewarded Indians whose advantages, skills, or luck enabled them to adopt Hispanic forms of accumulation, and punished those whose identification with the peasantry was too strong or aggressive. The political implications were profound. The lure of

success and the threat of loss recruited Indian allies to the colonial power structure, discouraged overt challenges that invited repression, and fragmented the internal unity of Andean society. The economic implications, too, were far-reaching. Success stimulated class differentiation within the "republic of Indians," dividing it into the rich and more acculturated on the one side, the poor and less acculturated on the other. The achievements of an Indian minority accelerated the erosion of traditional resources and relationships, while implanting Hispanic property, relationships, and culture deeply within the "internal" fabric of Indian life. The emergence of a colonial Indian elite generated new sources of social conflict, tension, and protest in native society. Yet here, too, was an element of tragedy. For in pressuring Indian elites to demonstrate their loyalties and service to the community, peasants acknowledged that they needed "Hispanic" wealth and skills to survive and defend themselves against colonial exploiters. And in the end, though peasant pressure placed certain limits, at given times and places, on the differentiation of Indian society into rich and poor, it could not reverse the overall trend.

For many of those left behind by Indian success, the only escape was escape itself, flight in search of a better life. Among the fugitives, a small fraction would themselves join the ranks of the successful Indians. As they rebuilt lives in a more Hispanic-mestizo mold, they would gain distance from a condemned Andean heritage left to the peasantry. But they could not escape entirely. A welter of memories, habits, relationships—and snubs—would bind them and their children to their Indian origins.

Notes

For complete references and footnotes, consult the original version of this piece, in Steve J. Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), pp. 158–183.

1 An *asiento* was a labor contract in which the hired party agreed to settle with and serve a master and employer for a specified length of time. A *mitayo* was an Indian laborer forcebly drafted to work for selected beneficiaries of the state.
2 An *encomendero* owns an *encomienda*, a land grant from the Spanish king.
3 The *composición de tierras* was the inspection and legalization of land title.
4 A *forastero* is literally a stranger, someone from a different *ayllu* or ethnic group.
5 A *yanacona* was a native retainer or serf bound to a colonial overlord.
6 *Originarios* were local *ayllu* Indians descended from common ancestor-gods, as distinguished from immigrant *forasteros* descended from foreign *ayllus* and ancestors.